Welfare as a cause of poverty: A time series analysis by Smith, Patricia K.
Public Choice 75: 157-170, 1993. 
© 1993 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands. 
Welfare as a cause o f  poverty: A time series analysis 
PATRICIA K. SMITH 
Department of Social Science, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI 48128-149I 
Accepted 25 April 1991 
1. Introduction 
Since the inception of welfare programs critics have argued that giving aid to 
the poor dampens their incentive to provide for themselves and their depen- 
dents. 1 Charles Murray's Los ing  Ground  (1984) presents a modern reincarna- 
tion of this "work disincentive hypothesis". He notes that both nominal wel- 
fare benefits and caseloads increased during the seventies, suggesting that 
higher benefits cause more people to join the welfare rolls. Others contend that 
welfare receipt may be a necessity rather than a matter of personal choice. Even 
if the nonworking poor actively sought employment many would not be able 
to find jobs. Furthermore, many would find only low paying jobs which would 
not enable them to work their way out of poverty (e.g., Abraham, 1983). In 
this view, unemployment, labor market segmentation, and low wages cause 
poverty. Which view is correct? 
Studies of the effects of welfare typically specify a single model and use 
regression analysis to test whether the data support its implications. In con- 
trast, this paper uses the Granger (1969) causality test in a system of welfare 
and employment equations. This strategy offers two advantages. First, regres- 
sion presumes causality whereas the Granger approach tests whether or not 
causality, defined in a technical sense, exists. Second, we can use a very general 
empirical model to test the work disincentive hypothesis as well as the implica- 
tions of two competing models. 
Section 2 presents three models of the welfare caseload and their implied pat- 
terns of causality. Section 3 explains Granger's concept of and test for causali- 
ty. In Section 4 the test is performed, indicating the direction of causality be- 
tween real AFDC benefits, the AFDC caseload, and unemployment. We then 
repeat the exercise using tabor force participation rates rather than unemploy- 
ment rates. The paper concludes with a summary of the results and their 
qualifications. 
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2. Three models of the welfare caseload 
A simple model of rational choice underlies the work disincentive hypothesis: 
An individual compares expected utility from work to the expected utility from 
nonwork and welfare dependency, and then chooses the state which generates 
the highest expected utility. Nonwork and welfare dependency give the in- 
dividual benefits (BEN) and increases leisure time (L). Work yields earnings 
(EARN), but lowers the amount of time available for leisure. Let the dichoto- 
mous variable WELFARE represent the individual's choice: 
I 1  if U(BEN, L, el) > U(EARN, L, e2) 
WELFARE = 0 otherwise (1) 
where e 1 and e 2 represent unobservable values regarding work and welfare. 
The higher are benefits, the higher the utility from receiving welfare and the 
more likely the individual is to choose nonwork and welfare dependency, 
ceteris paribus. Thus, increasing benefits will cause increased unemployment, 
decreased labor force participation, and higher caseloads (i.e., more poverty). 
Conversely, cutting benefits (Murray's prescription) will cause decreases in un- 
employment, increases in labor force participation, and decreases in caseloads. 
If true, three causal patterns could be observed. First, benefits cause unem- 
ployment (the choice of nonwork), which in turn causes the welfare caseload: 
Benefits --. Unemployment ~ Caseload 
Second, benefits might simultaneously cause unemployment and the welfare 
caseload: 
Benefits ~ Unemployment 
\ 
Caseload 
Third, benefits could directly cause the caseload through their impact on the 
welfare participation rates of the currently unemployed. An unemployed per- 
son may not initially be on welfare, but an increase in benefits could encourage 
them to participate: 
Benefits --* Caseload 
Analyses of labor supply responses to welfare benefits often examine the 
separate effects of changes in the guarantee and in the tax rate. These studies 
generally confirm that increasing the guarantee exerts a positive income effect, 
lowering labor supply as long as leisure is a normal good. 2 Estimates of the 
impact of lower tax rates suggest that labor supply would increase somewhat. 
However, lower tax rates would also raise the breakeven income level, increas- 
ing the number of people eligible for benefits. This mechanical response means 
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that lower tax rates will increase both benefits and the caseload. 
The general consensus seems to be that welfare programs cause reductions 
in labor supply, as the work disincentive model predicts, but that the decreases 
are fairly small. Danziger et al. (1981) estimate that the combined benefits for 
AFDC, Food Stamps, housing, and Medicaid caused only a 3.3% decline in 
overall labor supply in 1977. Moffitt (1983) notes that changes in real wages, 
the unemployment rate, and education exert greater influence on labor supply 
than do changes in welfare program parameters. 
Welfare critics often overlook the fact that the rational choice model (1) also 
implies that increases in earnings will raise the utility from employment, in- 
creasing the likelihood that the individual wilt choose work, rather than wet- 
fare, ceterisparibus. Policies which improve labor markets and human capital 
programs which enhance earnings potential will thus reduce caseloads, increase 
labor force participation, and decrease unemployment. The model's two impli- 
cations suggest different policy prescriptions: Spend less on the poor (cut 
benefits) and spend more on the poor (offer education and training programs). 
These implications should be considered jointly and suggest a reallocation of 
welfare spending, not necessarily a change in the level of spending. 
Furthermore, the work disincentive hypothesis implicitly assumes that jobs 
are available and that individuals simply choose not to take them. However, 
individuals may be unemployed and welfare dependent because they are in- 
voluntarily unemployed, i.e., they are laid off or no jobs are available in their 
area. Abraham (1983) presents compelling evidence that there are significantly 
more workers than job vacancies in the United States. Bassi (1990) finds that 
the increase in women's welfare receipt between 1967 and t979 partly results 
from an increase in their involuntary unemployment. 3 Wilson (t987) argues 
that high unemployment rates for young, black men contributes to underclass 
poverty. Unemployment renders these men "unsuitable" as marriage partners, 
hence families tend to form without marriage. The resulting mother-only 
households face a greater risk of poverty and welfare receipt. 
These "macroeconomic" hypotheses imply that unemployment causes the 
welfare caseload: 
Unemployment -* Caseload 
Finally, public choice theories predict that growth in the number of poor 
may cause benefits to rise. 4 First, increases in the number of poor could in- 
crease their strength as a voting bloc. The poor could use their voting power 
to elect officials who favor generous welfare programs. While possible, this 
seems unlikely given the well-documented low voter turnout among the poor. 
Furthermore, as Tullock (1983) explains, the costs of organizing the poor 
into an effective lobby are likely to be high. In any case, the more poor the 
more likely they are to be a significant political force. Or perhaps, the 
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more poor,  the greater the need for appeasement (social control) through wel- 
fare (Piven and Cloward, 1971). 
Leffler (1978) argues that welfare bureaucracies and labor unions, rather 
than the poor,  form effective pro-welfare interest groups. Labor unions may 
support  generous welfare policies for the same reason that they support mini- 
mum wage legislation and restrictive immigration policies: All three reduce the 
competition for union jobs. Anderson (1987) presents evidence that AFDC 
payments are positively correlated with the relative political influence of or- 
ganized labor. 5 The larger the poor  population, the greater the threat to union 
jobs and the more likely is the union to lobby in support of  generous welfare 
benefits. Also, the more poor,  the larger will be the welfare bureaucracy, whose 
members will be likely to lobby for its expansion. 
Second, an increase in the number of poor  relative to the number of  nonpoor 
could alter the voting distribution. Researchers often identify the median voter 
as the voter with the median income. 6 A large increase in the number of  poor  
relative to the number of  nonpoor  could lower the median income. A poorer 
median voter might be more sympathetic to the plight of  the poor or may sim- 
ply feel more at risk of slipping into poverty. In either case, the new median 
voter could have a greater incentive to support a more generous welfare 
system. 7 
If  the public choice theories are correct we would observe that caseloads 
cause benefits: 
Caseloads --* Benefits 
The work disincentive, macroeconomic, and public choice models predict 
very different patterns of  causality. The actual presence and strength of  each 
pattern remain an empirical issue to be resolved. 
3. Granger causality 
Granger (1969) proposes that X t "causes"  Yt if information on past and 
present X t significantly improves the forecast of  Yt .8 Formally, let a station- 
ary, normally distributed bivariate autoregressive process of  order p generate 
X t and Yt: 
X t = all (L )Xt_  1 + a,2 (L)Yt -1  + Elt 
Yt = a21 (L) X t_ 1 + a22 (L) Yt-1 + E2t 
(2) 
where L denotes the lag operator (L = 0, 1 . . . .  p -  1). Assuming past and 
present X t and Yt represent all relevant information, X t Granger-causes Yt if 
the fi2t(L) differ significantly f rom zero. I f  both the ~21(L) and fi12(L) are non- 
zero, there is feedback between the two variables: X t and Yt simultaneously 
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cause each other. Note that this tests the ability of  X t to predict Yt, which, in 
a strict philosophical sense, differs f rom the notion that X t causes Yt" 
Nevertheless, the test offers a better means of  determining whether one series 
precedes ("causes")  another than the simple visual inspection of  time plots 
used by Murray and others. 
4. Granger causality and AFDC 
To test the three models of  welfare caseloads we estimate systems of  the fol- 
lowing general form: 
CASE t = alI(L)CASE t + al2(L)BEN t + al3(L)UNEM t + Eft 
BEN t = a21(L)CASE t + a22(L)BEN t + a23(L)UNEM t + Ezt 
UNEM t = a31(L)CASE t + a32(L)BEN t + a33(L)UNEM t + E3t 
(3) 
where CASE is the AFDC caseload, BEN is the real AFDC benefit, UNEM is 
unemployment, and the E's are random disturbance terms. Tests of  the joint 
significance of  the gij(L) will indicate Granger-causal relationships within the 
system. For example, if benefits encourage the choice of  unemployment in ord- 
er to qualify for welfare (BEN -- UNEM--  CASE), then the ~32(L) and ~13(L) 
would differ significantly f rom zero. 
The data are monthly observations of  national averages from October 1974 
to October 1987 for whites and from October 1974 to December 1982 for 
minorities. 9 Complete series on monthly earnings are not available, hence the 
omission of  earnings from the empirical model. We consider two measures of  
the caseload, the number of  families on AFDC and the number of  individual 
recipients. The family caseload will capture any influence of  benefits on family 
participation and on the formation of  female-headed households. The in- 
dividual recipient caseload will capture any effect of  benefits on individual par- 
ticipation and on family size. 
We disaggregate the unemployment statistic, measured as either the rate or 
level, by race and gender. 1° This will enable us to detect differences in 
responses to welfare and employment opportunities by race and gender. Previ- 
ous research suggests that such differences are likely. For example, Bergman 
(1971) presents evidence that discrimination crowds blacks into certain occupa- 
tions, resulting in the lower marginal productivity of  blacks with the same edu- 
cation as whites. Barrett and Morgenstern (1974) conclude that if blacks were 
not so concentrated in service jobs and unskilled occupations their employment 
rate would be significantly higher. 
Differences across genders will be particularly important  because the majori- 
ty of  AFDC recipients live in female-headed households. Labor supply studies 
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Table 1. Causality patterns for family caseload and unemployment of blacks and other minorities 
Marginal significance of F-test 
Case Ben Unem 
Marginal significance of Q (27) 
Case .000 .020 .700 .219 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .5 t6 .536 .707 .957 
Unem .803 .599 .094 .952 UNEM 
(le'eel) 
Case .000 .033 .572 .125 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .487 .419 .675 .891 
Unem .861 .747 .244 .879 UNEM 
(rate) 
Case .000 .064 .934 .642 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .475 .606 .905 .950 
Unem .864 .519 .329 .993 UNEM 
(male level) 
Case .000 .086 .919 .578 BEN -'-* CASE 
Ben .422 .552 .848 .886 
Unem .887 .274 .470 .974 UNEM 
(male rate) 
Case .000 .023 .352 .005 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .452 .627 .646 .971 
Unem .928 .850 .027 .675 UNEM 
(female level) 
Case .000 .017 .220 .002 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .495 .682 .738 .987 
Unem .922 .947 ,061 .515 UNEM 
(female rate) 
typically f ind that  women ' s  supply of  l abor  is more  elastic t han  men ' s  (e.g., 
H a u s m a n ,  1981). This difference means  that  the effects of changes in wages 
or welfare on  labor  force par t ic ipa t ion  and  hours  worked may differ across 
genders.  
W o m e n  may  respond different ly  because they of ten bear pr imary  responsi- 
bility for the care of  children.  Burkhauser  and  D u n c a n  (1989) f ind that  w ome n  
are six t imes more  likely t h a n  men  to slip in to  poverty  fol lowing divorce. They 
are twice as likely as men  to become poor  fol lowing the b i r th  of a child. Bowen 
and  F inegan  (1969) and  Blau and Robins  (1988) present  evidence that  the 
presence of young  chi ldren is a s ignif icant  and  negative inf luence on  w o m e n ' s  
labor  supply.  Fur the rmore ,  work  by Conne l ly  (1989) suggests that  unmar r i ed  
mothers  are more  sensitive to the price of child care t han  are marr ied  mothers .  
The addi t iona l  costs and  const ra ints  single mothers  face will likely inf luence 
their responses to welfare and  emp loymen t  oppor tuni t ies .  Lowering benefi ts  
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Table 2. Causality patterns for recipient caseload and unemployment of blacks and other 
minorities 
Marginal significance of F-test 
Case Ben Unem 
Marginal significance of Q (27) 
Case .000 .039 .790 .076 BEN -'~ CASE 
Ben .490 .638 .711 .913 
Unem .908 .574 .115 .983 UNEM 
(level) 
Case .000 ,048 .717 .043 BEN-'-, CASE 
Ben ,482 ,541 .700 .824 
Unem ,936 .681 .284 .952 UNEM 
(rate) 
Case .000 .103 .917 .253 BEN-*  CASE 
Ben .441 .696 .902 .895 
Unem .735 ,238 ,211 .953 UNEM 
(male level) 
Case .000 .110 .878 .323 BEN CASE 
Ben .404 ,677 .856 .821 "N 
Unem .685 .074 ,272 .944 UNEM 
(male rate) 
Case .000 ,006 .166 ,002 BEN - "  CASE 
Ben .521 ,760 .747 ,959 
Unem .949 ,854 ,030 .753 UNEM 
(female level) 
Case .000 .004 .095 ,000 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .562 .801 ,826 ,98t z / 
Unem .903 ,9t0 .055 ,653 UNEM 
(female rate) 
may discourage welfare recipiency and encourage labor force participation of 
some individuals, but it is less likely to have a similar impact on women who 
must care for children or pay someone else to do so. 
The autocorrelation and partial autocorretation functions of each series sug- 
gest that a first-differenced system in thirteen lags (a little over a year) is ade- 
quate.ll The Q-statistics (which test for higher order serial correlation) con- 
firm model adequacy. 12 Table 1 presents the results using the family caseload 
and minority unemployment statistics. AFDC benefits Granger-cause the fam- 
ily caseload in all six specifications. The caseload does not Granger-cause 
benefits, and unemployment does not Granger-cause the caseload. These 
results support only the work disincentive hypothesis. 
Estimation of the system using the individual caseload produces slightly 
different results (Tabte 2). Benefits unilaterally Granger-cause the caseload in 
five of the six specifications. Benefits also appear to Granger-cause the rate of 
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Table 3, Causality patterns for family caseload and white unemployment 
Marginal significance of F-test 
Case Ben Unem 
Marginal significance of Q(33) 
Case .000 .028 .454 .294 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .141 . t 69 .890 .423 N,, 
Unem .605 .089 .270 .675 UNEM 
(level) 
Case .000 .048 .723 .39t BEN ~'~ CASE 
Ben .054 ,120 .580 ,469 
Unem .648 .133 .335 .934 UNEM 
(rate) 
Case .000 .064 .480 .221 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .103 .293 .904 .704 ~ ,  
Unem .791 .080 .276 .951 UNEM 
(male level) 
Case .000 ,042 .350 .279 BEN ~-~ CASE 
Ben ,078 .326 ,729 .737 
Unem .897 .161 .235 .982 UNEM 
(male rate) 
Case ,000 .054 ,265 .789 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben ,081 .091 .956 .612 
Unem .929 .290 .239 .613 UNEM 
(female level) 
Case .000 .086 .277 .604 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .056 .072 .852 .412 
Unem .946 .246 .261 .774 UNEM 
(female rate) 
u n e m p l o y m e n t  a m o n g  m i n o r i t y  men.  Bo th  o f  these results  s u p p o r t  the  work  
dis incent ive  hypothes is .  The  ra te  o f  m i n o r i t y  female  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  however ,  
Granger -causes  the  A F D C  case load .  This result  suppor t s  the  m a c r o e c o n o m i c  
m o d e l  ins tead .  Las t ly ,  there  is n o  evidence t ha t  the  case load  Granger -causes  the  
benef i t s .  
Tab le  3 presents  the results  when we es t imate  the system using the fami ly  
case load  and  white u n e m p l o y m e n t  stat ist ics.  F e e d b a c k  be tween  benef i ts  and  
the  case load  appea r s  in five o f  the  six speci f ica t ions .  This  resul t  suppor t s  bo th  
the  work  dis incent ive  a n d  the publ ic  choice mode ls .  Benefi ts  also Grange r -  
cause the  level o f  white  u n e m p l o y m e n t  and  the level o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  a m o n g  
white  males .  These  pa t t e rns  a lso  suppor t  the  w o r k  dis incent ive  hypothes i s .  
The  causa l  pa t t e rn s  d i f fer  fu r the r  when we measure  the  case load  as the num-  
ber  o f  ind iv idua l  A F D C  recipients  (Table  4). Only  three  speci f ica t ions  exhibi t  
s igni f icant  f eedback  be tween  the  case load  and  real  benef i t s .  Benef i ts  uni la te r -  
a l ly  Granger -cause  the  ind iv idua l  case load  in  the  r ema in ing  equa t ions .  Benefi ts  
Table 4. Causality patterns for recipient caseload and white unemployment 
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Marginal significance of F-test 
Case Ben Unem 
Marginal significance of Q(33) 
Case .000 .010 .539 .466 BEN---~ CASE 
Ben .149 .214 .887 .332 ",, 
Unem .741 .052 ,361 .617 UNEM 
(level) 
Case .000 .016 ,629 .520 BEN ~-* CASE 
Ben ,062 .186 ,600 .388 N~ 
Unem .739 .072 .359 .957 UNEM 
(rate) 
Case ,000 .022 .628 .293 BEN--* CASE 
Ben .126 .326 ,917 .671 xN 
Unem .927 .087 ,399 .911 UNEM 
(male level) 
Case .000 .018 .538 .348 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .086 .374 .733 .650 
Unem .971 .t73 ,333 .968 UNEM 
(male rate) 
Case .000 .020 .328 .756 BEN ---* CASE 
Ben ,128 ,108 .967 .588 
Unem ,931 .218 .210 .658 UNEM 
(female level) 
Case ,000 .026 .188 .561 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .105 ,092 ,921 .476 
Unem .967 .195 ,218 .855 UNEM 
(female rate) 
also Grange r - cause  u n e m p l o y m e n t  in ha l f  o f  the  speci f ica t ions .  Specif ical ly ,  
benefi ts  Grange r - cause  white  u n e m p l o y m e n t  (level and  rate)  and  the level o f  
whi te  male  u n e m p l o y m e n t .  
In  s u m m a r y ,  the  tests genera l ly  s u p p o r t  the  w o r k  dis incent ive  m o d e l ' s  
hypothes i s  tha t  benef i t s  cause  the  case load .  This  p a t t e r n  appea r s  cons is ten t ly  
across  race  and  gender .  The  tests p r o d u c e  weak  evidence tha t  benef i t s  G r a n g e r -  
cause  u n e m p l o y m e n t .  This  pa t t e rn  appea r s  mos t  f r equen t ly  fo r  whites and  
males .  This  suggests t ha t  the  u n e m p l o y m e n t  o f  w o m e n  is de t e rmined  by  fac tors  
o the r  than  the  level o f  wel fare  benef i ts .  
Eight  spec i f ica t ions  (all using whi te  l a b o r  s tat is t ics)  ind ica te  f eedback  be- 
tween case loads  and  benef i ts .  These  cases p rov ide  the on ly  suppor t  for  the pub-  
lic choice hypo thes i s  tha t  case loads  cause benef i t s .  H o w e v e r ,  it is no t  clear why  
the case load  Granger -causes  benef i t s  only  when we con t ro l  for  u n e m p l o y m e n t  
a m o n g  whites.  
The  use o f  u n e m p l o y m e n t  s tat is t ics  to  measu re  l a b o r  responses  to  welfare  
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Table 5. Causality patterns among benefits, caseloads, and labor force participation rates: Whites 
Marginal significance of F-test Marginal significance of Q 
(27) 
Families 
Case Ben LFP 
Case .0000 .0652 .0228 .1516 BEN "-* CASE 
Ben .1420 .0237 .2899 .9389 / "  
LFP .0944 .1300 .0000 .6691 LFP 
(rate for females) 
Case .0000 .0190 .0012 .9523 BEN "-~ CASE 
Ben .8468 .2336 .0621 .8864 N , , / I  
LFP .4927 .1558 .0000 .0170 LFP 
(rate for males) 
Individuals 
Case .0000 .0012 .0119 .6479 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .0510 .0331 .1136 .7813 ,,7 
LFP .1817 .3150 .0000 .8448 LFP 
(rate for females) 
Case .0000 .0039 .0004 .8148 BEN ~ CASE 
Ben .8757 .4283 .1500 .8764 , 7  
LFP .3138 .1416 .0000 .0216 LFP 
(rate for males) 
benefits may be too restrictive: Generous benefits could induce withdrawal 
from the labor force. Tables 5 and 6 present the results when we estimate the 
system using labor force participation rates instead of unemployment statis- 
tics. 13 Benefits unilaterally Granger-cause the caseload in seven of the eight 
specifications. These results are consistent with the work disincentive 
hypothesis. 
Unemployment generally does not Granger-cause welfare caseloads, but 
labor force participation does: all eight specifications exhibit this pattern. 
Also, while earlier results offered limited evidence that benefits Granger-cause 
unemployment, there is no evidence that benefits Granger-cause labor force 
participation. In fact, labor force participation rates Granger-cause the 
benefits in three of the specifications. In short, benefits do not appear to affect 
labor force participation as the work disincentive model predicts. If the 
presence of small children more strongly influences the decision to withdraw 
from the labor force than do AFDC benefits we would expect exactly these 
results. 
Male labor force participation rates also seem to matter. In all four specifica- 
tions male labor force participation Granger-causes the AFDC caseload. This 
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Table 6. Causality patterns among benefits, caseloads, and labor force participation: Blacks and 
other minorities 
Marginal significance of F-test Marginal significance of Q (27) 
Families 
Case Ben LFP 
Case .0000 .0077 .0203 .2404 BEN -'-* CASE 
Ben .2319 .1763 .2112 .7921 ,7 
LFP .3959 ,5830 .0000 .2164 LFP 
(rate for females) 
Case .0000 .0t90 .0363 .8927 BEN--* CASE 
Ben .5241 ,2182 .033t .4435 ~ . / "  
LFP .1981 ,5883 .0000 .4137 LFP 
(rate for males) 
Individuals 
Case ,0000 .00t3 ,0104 . 6 5 5 1  BEN~CASE 
Ben .4557 .256l .3602 .8508 / I  
LFP ,1798 .5322 .0000 .2410 LFP 
(rate for females) 
Case .0000 .0009 .0030 .9506 BEN ---* CASE 
Ben .6521 .2161 .0395 .4292 "N /* 
LFP .1040 .6449 ,0000 .1850 LFP 
(rate for males) 
suggests that tow male labor force participation Granger-causes the caseload. 
But what causes low male labor force participation? Certainly high unemploy- 
ment and /or  low wages are possible factors. 
5. Summary and conclusions 
Table 7 summarizes our findings with respect to each of  the three models of  
the welfare caseload. The Granger causality tests reveal that AFDC benefits 
generally Granger-cause the caseload. This finding supports the work disincen- 
tive hypothesis that benefits cause people to join the welfare rolls. However, 
benefits may cause higher caseloads by prompting a behavioral response or, if 
the benefits rise due to a decrease in the tax rate, by extending eligibility. The 
work disincentive model also predicts that benefits cause unemployment. This 
pattern appears in only six specifications, most of  which use white unemploy- 
ment measures. Lastly, there is no evidence that benefits Granger-cause labor 
force participation. 
The public choice model garners some support. While there is no evidence 
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Table 7. Summary of results 
Model/Hypothesis Implied causal patterns Fraction of supporting tests* 
Work disincentive BEN "--* CASE 3t/32 
BEN"'* UNEM 6/24 
BEN --- LFP 0/8 
Public Choice CASE "--~ BEN 9/12 
Macroeconomic UNEM --* CASE 1/24 
LFP "--* CASE 8/8 
* Tests significant at 90% or higher levels. Includes tests which indicate feedback (mutual cau- 
sation), 
tha t  the  case load  un i l a te ra l ly  Granger -causes  benef i t s ,  nine speci f ica t ions  ex- 
h ibi t  f eedback  be tween  the  case load  and  benef i t s .  The  tests of fer  v i r tua l ly  no 
suppo r t  for  the  hypo thes i s  tha t  u n e m p l o y m e n t  causes wel fa re  case loads .  L a b o r  
force  pa r t i c i pa t i on  rates ,  on  the  o the r  h a n d ,  do  Grange r - cause  the  case load  
(but  benef i ts  do  no t  Grange r - cause  l abo r  force  pa r t i c ipa t ion ) .  This  resul t  is 
cons is ten t  wi th  the  hypo thes i s  tha t  the  presence  o f  y o u n g  chi ldren  is p r o b a b l y  
a m o r e  i m p o r t a n t  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  w o m e n ' s  l abo r  supp ly  t han  are  wel fare  
benef i t s .  I f  t rue ,  lower  benef i ts  m a y  no t  increase  the  l abo r  force  pa r t i c ipa t ion  
o f  female  heads ,  nor  will  increases in j o b  t ra in ing  p r o g r a m s ,  unless a f f o r d a b l e  
chi ld  care  becomes  read i ly  avai lab le .  
These  results  mus t  be t aken  as suggestive ra the r  t han  as conclusive.  As  in all  
causa l i ty  tests,  the  results  can be  mis lead ing  when the mode l  omi t s  i m p o r t a n t  
var iables .  Never theless ,  the  use o f  the Grange r - causa l i t y  test reveals  some in- 
t r iguing pa t t e rns  and  offers  some insight  into the  re la t ionships  be tween  
benef i t s ,  case loads ,  u n e m p l o y m e n t ,  and  l abo r  force  pa r t i c ipa t ion .  This  ap-  
p r o a c h  of fers  a re la t ively  s imple  w a y  to test  the  impl ica t ions  o f  a var ie ty  o f  
compe t ing  mode l s  o f  the  effects  o f  benef i ts  and  l abo r  m a r k e t  condi t ions  on  
welfare  case loads .  
Notes  
1. For example, after touring Britain in 1776 Ben Franklin warned that the English welfare policy 
"offered a premium for the encouragement of idleness, and you should not now wonder that 
it has had its effect in the increase in poverty." On the Price o f  Corn and Management o f  the 
Poor. 
2. For example, see Hausman (1981) and Moffitt 0983) for estimated responses based on data 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Ashenfelter presents estimates using SIME/DIME 
data. 
3. The other major cause of the increase in AFDC participation over this period was the lowering 
of the implicit tax rate. This change made more citizens eligible for AFDC. 
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4. For example, Cebula (1976) presents a regression analysis in which the number of persons on 
AFDC significantly and positively influences the benefit level. 
5. Anderson (1987) also finds that AFDC payments are not significantly correlated with the 
poors' voting strength or lobbying efforts. 
6. Inman (1978) tests the validity of the assumption that the median voter is the voter with the 
median income. He finds that the data are generally consistent with this assumption. 
7. Increasing caseloads could cause benefits to fall. Many analyses of state budgeting find that 
the greater the number of poor, or the greater the ratio of poor to nonpoor, the lower is total 
state expenditure on welfare (e.g., Orr, 1976). Also, if the poor tend to congregate in public 
areas such as commuter stations and beg, the nonpoor may feel overwhelmed, irritated, and 
even resentful. Support for welfare could then decrease. 
8. For a review of the causality literature see Pierce and Haugh (I977). 
9. The monthly AFDC caseloads and nominal benefits were provided by Emmett Dye, Office of 
Family Assistance, Department of  Health and Human Services. We use the CPI-U, published 
in the Survey o f  Current Business, to calculate real benefits. The unemployment statistics are 
all published in Employment and Earnings. Prior to January 1983 the BLS reported unemploy- 
ment statistics for "whites" and "blacks and others". Beginning in January 1983 the 
categories changed to "whites", "blacks only", and "others" .  
Using national averages may induce some aggregation bias. 
10. Complete records of the monthly caseload by race are not available over the sample period. 
11. The Akaike, Schwarz, and Final Prediction Error (FPE) criteria were also calculated for the 
first system specification. All three confirmed the choice of thirteen lags. 
12. Q(p) is the Ljung-Box autocorrelation test statistic: 
Q = N ( N + 2 ) [  ~ j = l  --N- ~ 1 r 2 ]  j 
where r i is the jth lag autocorrelation of the residuals. This statistic tests the null hypothesis 
that the residuals are white noise, i.e., there is no serious high order autocorrelation. See Ljung 
and Box (1978). 
13. Monthly labor force participation rates are reported only for whites and minorities disag- 
gregated by gender. 
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